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Summary 
What forces have shaped our nation’s employment and remuneration record so 
far? Where is Singapore’s unemployment rate headed? What should policy-makers do 
about it? These are the questions tackled in this paper.     
It is shown that based on our historical experience, it would be necessary to 
achieve an annual real GDP growth rate of 7.1 percent in order to keep the 
unemployment rate unchanged. Moreover, a one-percentage point shortfall of the real 
GDP growth rate below 7.1 percent in any given year results in a rise in the 
unemployment rate of 0.12 percentage points over the previous year. Consequently, if the 
economy is able to generate at most 5 percent real GDP annual growth rate (the high end 
of the range of official medium-term projections of our economy’s growth rate, which is 
3 to 5 percent), it would seem that the unemployment rate is set to rise from its current 
level based upon the historical relationship.  
Is there any reason, however, to believe that the Okun’s Law relationship for a 
fast-developing country like ours might be expected to change once we have reached the 
status of a mature economy as we now have become? After all, in a mature economy like 
the US, the critical real GDP growth rate required to keep the unemployment rate steady 
is only 3 percent. It is likely that the Okun’s Law relationship would indeed shift as the 
economy matures. As workers adjust their expectations to the reality that the economy 
has reached a new lower growth regime and they incorporate their revised growth 
expectations in their wage bargaining, the unemployment rate can remain steady despite 
slower growth. This steady structural rate of unemployment is, however, likely to be 
higher than in the past.  
In response to the worsened medium to long term outlook for the labor market, 
one is tempted to ask: Can anything be done by policy-makers to reduce the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment? I believe that reaching out for a weaker Singapore dollar in order 
to boost international competitiveness, and so to boost aggregate demand and hence 
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employment, or reaching out for budgetary deficits as a direct means to boost aggregate 
demand is unlikely to have a lasting effect on the structural rate of unemployment. 
Instead that it would be better to consider policies aimed directly at influencing 
equilibrium unemployment. One proposal is to introduce an employment subsidy scheme 
aimed particularly at low-skilled workers, which has the effect of increasing job creation 
directly. Increased effort to create a business-friendly environment to encourage new 
start-ups by ensuring minimal red tape and enabling relatively easy financing for them 
will also work to increase the pace of job creation. Finally, the work of the Workforce 
Development Agency aimed at retraining low-skilled and older workers to meet the skills 
demand of new jobs and then matching them to firms offering the job vacancies should 
help somewhat in bringing down the structural rate of unemployment as our small 
geographical area works to our advantage when it comes to job-matching.  
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Introduction 
Having a job that pays a living wage is vital for maintaining one’s sense of well-being. 
The benefits of employment go beyond just simply having the financial means to support 
a certain lifestyle. There are also important non-pecuniary benefits that one derives from 
working. Work provides us the mental stimulus from solving various sorts of problems. It 
provides us the satisfaction of achieving something significant. The social interactions 
developed at the workplace teach us inter-personal skills that are important for getting 
along with others. There are also community effects. In a society where most people are 
able to obtain productive employment, and there are job ladders to climb, it is possible to 
point to role models to motivate others to work hard to achieve worthwhile goals. Such a 
society is apt to be characterized by a sense of optimism and adventure, a willingness to 
try out new things. 
 
In contrast, prolonged unemployment can be devastating both for individuals as 
well as for whole communities. Losing a job means more than forgoing earnings. When 
repeated attempts to land another job that would provide similar challenges and 
remuneration found in the previous job end up in failure, poor morale sets in.  That can 
affect a person’s relationship with others including other family members. Tempers flare 
up more often and communication becomes more difficult. In neighborhoods with a large 
number of people without a job, there are fewer role models to point to who can act to 
motivate others to work hard at school so that they can land a good job later on. Worse 
still, such an environment can fester a lack of regard for common property and encourage 
theft and crime. Prolonged unemployment therefore produces social costs that exceed 
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private costs, which suggests that society should be willing to spend more resources than 
the sum of what all individuals on their own would be willing to spend to increase the 
number of people who are economically employed.   
 
One thing should be clear, however, at the very outset. No society can hope, by 
sheer use of state-mandated policy alone, to engineer a state of full employment. Such an 
outcome, even if achievable, would not be characterized by the quality of dynamism and 
spontaneous discovery needed for an enterprising and well-functioning economy. 
Consequently, for a society to provide a rich array of jobs that also offer good pay, it 
would be necessary to have a relatively large and active private sector. That is not to say 
that the public sector itself cannot be a major employer in a dynamic economy. It can be. 
However, apart from the direct employment generated by the state’s provision of public 
goods, the bulk of all hiring done by the public sector should generally be derived from 
the need to develop the right institutions to support a thriving private sector that will be 
well-equipped to catch the business opportunities that technology and an evolving world 
economy provide. 
 
As our nation completes its forty years of independence with job losses hogging 
the headlines in recent years, a foremost question on the mind of many people as they 
look to the future might be, “What are my job prospects?” Can an economist pin down a 
basic framework for answering this very important question? What forces have shaped 
our nation’s employment and remuneration record so far and do we have reason to 
believe that these forces have changed? If so, in what direction have they changed? This 
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chapter will attempt to develop such a framework, and use it to answer the questions just 
posed. 
 
In looking ahead to the future, and thinking about future job prospects, it is useful 
to understand where we were and how we got to be where we are today. This is because 
there is a certain momentum that carries an economy along during its catch-up phase, 
which impacts hugely on job generation, and it will be important to determine if such a 
phase is largely over. In my conceptualization, the catch-up phase can be likened to the 
arrival of a big wave. It carries in its wake a rising tide that lifts many boats. When that 
catch-up phase is over, however, the economy must settle down to a more normal pace 
that more mature economies invariably find themselves. Some questions to be asked 
about such mature economies are: What determines the equilibrium volume of 
joblessness in such mature economies? Do we have evidence that there exist periodic 
waves that may not be of the same scale as those seen during the catch-up phase but that 
are nonetheless big enough to generate a sufficiently large number of challenging jobs? 
What characteristics of the economy will enable it to ride on such periodic waves? 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we examine our 
employment record according sub periods which I identify as the catch-up phase (1966-
1985), the golden decade (1989-1998) and the turbulent years (1998-2003). We then turn 
our attention to the future with the focus to answer two questions: Where is Singapore’s 
unemployment rate headed? What should policy-makers do about it? We then end with a 
conclusion.  
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 Our Employment Record 
Figure 1 shows how the unemployment rate, that is, the ratio of the number of 
unemployed workers to the size of the labour force or alternatively the share of the 
workforce without a job, has evolved since 1966. We can identify some patterns. From 
1966 to 1985 (the “catch-up phase”), there was a fairly steady decline of the 
unemployment rate going from close to 9 percent in 1966 to just over 3 percent in 1985. 
A sharp spike in the unemployment rate occurred over 1986 to 1987 but this gave way to 
an unusually low and stable rate of unemployment that hovered around 2 percent in the 
next decade---the “golden decade”---from 1989 to 1998 before it started climbing up 
since the onslaught of the Asian financial crisis---the “turbulent years”---to reach over 4.5 
percent in 2003. (Table 1 provides some average numbers for the unemployment rate for 
different time periods.) Figure 2 shows how workers’ real wage earnings---their pay in 
dollars deflated by the consumer price index---have changed since 1985. We find a 
dramatic recovery of real wage earnings after the sharp downturn of 1986-87 followed by 
sharp wage gains during the golden decade of accompanying 2-percent unemployment 
rate. This period was followed by sharper fluctuations in real wage earnings during the 
turbulent years of 1998-2003.  
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Figure 1 
Unemployment Rate 
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Table 1 
Average Unemployment and Inflation Rates (Various Grouped Years) 
 
Decade Averages Semi-decade Averages Era Averages 
Years Unemployment Inflation Years Unemployment Inflation Years Unemployment Inflation 
         
1966-75 6.0 5.5 1966-70 7.4 1.2 1966-90 4.5 3.8 
1976-85 3.4 3.5 1971-75 4.5 9.7 1991-03 2.9 1.4 
1986-95 2.9 1.5 1976-80 3.8 3.8    
1996-03 3.3 0.7 1981-85 3.1 3.3 1991-97 2.2 2.3 
   1986-90 3.6 1.3 1998-03 3.7 0.4 
1970-79 4.4 5.9 1991-95 2.2 2.6    
1980-89 3.5 2.8 1996-00 2.8 0.9    
1990-99 2.4 1.9 2001-03 4.1 0.4    
2000-03 3.8 0.6       
         
 
Source: Ministry of Manpower 
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Figure 2 
Real Wage Level and Real Wage Growth 
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The Catch-up Phase 
How do we account for the steady decline of the unemployment rate in the first two 
decades since independence? According to Keynesian economics, the monetary authority 
through an increase of the money supply can engineer an expansion of employment by 
generating an inflation rate that exceeds the level expected by the public. One mechanism 
through which this can occur is the following. Imagine that in any period, a fraction of 
the workforce, say half the workforce, negotiates its wage contract in dollar terms for the 
current and next period. Given the capital stock and technology, which determine 
workers’ productivity at their job, the nominal wage will be set based upon the inflation 
rate workers expect to prevail during the entire term of the contract. In the next period, 
the other half of the labour force negotiates its two-period wage contract. Consequently, 
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in any given period, the economy-wide nominal wage is an average of the wages set in 
the two overlapping wage contracts of the two halves of the labour force. If the monetary 
authority engineers a monetary expansion, the economy will experience an inflation rate 
that turns out to be higher than the level expected by the half of the workforce that 
negotiated its wage in the previous period. Consequently, firms will find that, at given 
levels of workers’ productivity, it is profitable to hire more workers, at any rate, more 
than the previous number it had earlier planned to hire. An economic boom with an 
accompanying employment expansion would have been engineered through a monetary 
stimulus. 
 
But are such employment gains permanent? Since the public soon adjusts its 
expectations of the inflation rate to the higher rate actually experienced, the monetary 
authority would have to constantly generate ever higher rates of inflation in order to 
produce the needed “inflation surprise” to keep the unemployment rate below the “natural 
rate of unemployment”---the inflation surprise-free rate of unemployment. This is the 
accelerationist hypothesis of Milton Friedman (1968) and Edmund Phelps (1968) 
derivable from their expectations-augmented Phillips curve. If, for simplicity, we suppose 
that the public forms its expectation of this period’s inflation rate solely on the basis of 
the past period’s inflation rate, the Friedman-Phelps formulation will generate a 
negatively-sloped schedule relating the change in inflation rate to the contemporaneous 
rate of unemployment; where the schedule intersects the horizontal axis, we should 
obtain a unique natural rate of unemployment. To keep the economy’s unemployment 
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rate permanently below the natural rate of unemployment, we would have to steadily 
raise the inflation rate.  
 
Do we have any evidence that the steady decline in Singapore’s unemployment 
rate in the two decades after it gained independence was the result of an activist monetary 
authority stimulating aggregate demand by engineering monetary expansions? If this was 
the case, and if we accept the Friedman-Phelps natural rate hypothesis, we would expect 
to see the decline in unemployment rate occurring in tandem with steadily rising inflation 
rates. What do we find in the data? Figure 3 plots the change in inflation rate against the 
rate of unemployment for the period 1966-2003. What we fail to detect in the figure is an 
unambiguously negatively-sloped schedule giving a unique intersection with the 
horizontal axis. Instead, we find that there has been relatively little variation in the 
inflation rate but fairly large variations in the unemployment rate. As Table 1 reveals, 
when the average decadal unemployment rate of 6.0 percent for the period 1966-75 fell to 
3.4 percent for the period 1976-85, a near halving of the original level in the previous 
decade, the average decadal inflation rate did not rise but instead fell from 5.5 percent to 
3.5 percent. What this suggests is that the steady decline of Singapore’s unemployment 
rate in the first two decades after its independence was not the result of a decline in 
cyclical unemployment brought about by monetary expansion but rather reflected 
primarily a decline of the natural rate of unemployment itself. 
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Figure 3 
Scatter Plot of Change in Inflation Rate vs Unemployment Rate 
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            Source: Ministry of Manpower (Unemployment rate); International Financial Statistics (Inflation rate) 
 
 
If we are right that the bulk of the decline of the unemployment rate observed 
over the two decades after independence was largely structural in nature, the next 
question to ask is, “What determines an economy’s natural rate of unemployment, 
alternatively referred to as the structural rate of unemployment and the equilibrium rate 
of unemployment?” To answer this question, we propose to apply to our data a 
conceptual framework that can be summarized in two diagrams, one a Beveridge curve 
diagram and another a Marshallian labour-market diagram. The Beveridge curve tells us 
that, at a given separation rate that breaks up a worker-firm match or alternatively at a 
given retrenchment rate, a decrease in the unemployment rate requires an increase in the 
job vacancy rate to make the inflow into the unemployment pool equal to the outflow 
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from the unemployment pool.1 Thus the Beveridge curve is represented by a negatively-
sloped schedule in Diagram 1. There are two factors that shift the Beveridge curve. An 
increase in the job separation rate as well as an increase in “job mismatch” shift out the 
Beveridge curve. 
 
To pin down the actual combination of vacancy rate and unemployment rate that 
we can observe in equilibrium, we need to determine the actual level of labour-market 
tightness, which we represent by the ratio of the vacancy rate to the unemployment rate. 
Thus we say that the labour market is tight if there are more job vacancies per 
unemployed worker. If we can determine the actual level of labour-market tightness, a 
ray from the origin can be drawn as illustrated in Diagram 1 to give us the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment as well as the corresponding job vacancy rate. But how do we 
determine the actual level of labour-market tightness? For this we turn to Diagram 2, 
which depicts the Marshallian labour-market equilibrium. 
                                                        
 
 
                                                 
1 If we imagine a sink with the water level representing the number of people employed, the size of water 
outflow must be matched by an equal-sized water inflow if we are to maintain an unchanged rate of 
unemployment. If the rate of outflow (given by the job separation rate) is unchanged, maintaining a higher 
water level (that is, a lower rate of unemployment) means maintaining a larger size of water outflow that 
must be matched by an equal-sized larger water inflow. That larger inflow has to be drawn from a smaller 
pool of unemployed people so the rate at which an unemployed person can be successfully matched to a job 
(the job accession rate) must correspondingly be raised. The latter, in turn, is achieved when the vacancy 
rate is increased. Hence we obtain a negative relationship between the vacancy rate and the unemployment 
rate along a given Beveridge curve.        
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Diagram 1 
The Beveridge Curve 
13
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Diagram 2 
Marshallian Labour-Market Equilibrium 
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Note 
v     :  Vacancy Rate  
u     :  Unemployment Rate 
w/p :  Real Wage 
 
The upward-sloping schedule in Diagram 2 gives us the wage-setting curve. We 
can interpret this curve as telling us what wage workers bargain for at any level of labour-
market tightness. When the labour market is very tight, so there are more job vacancies 
per unemployed worker, the wage that workers feel empowered to bargain for is 
accordingly high. There are other factors, however, that affect the wage that workers feel 
empowered to bargain for apart from the extent of labour-market tightness. If workers 
have vast resources to draw upon in the event that they lose their jobs, they will feel 
emboldened to bargain for higher wages at any given level of labour-market tightness. As 
an example, if the state provides more generous unemployment benefits---so the 
replacement rate is higher and the duration of receipt of the benefit is longer, say---there 
will be an upward shift of the wage-setting curve. An increase in workers’ wealth will 
also have the effect of shifting up the wage-setting curve. When workers have 
accumulated a large stock of assets, they can enjoy a big stream of non-wage income, 
which makes them less fearful about losing their jobs. Accordingly, they are more willing 
to press for higher wages at any given level of labour-market tightness.         
 
The downward-sloping schedule in Diagram 2 gives us the labour-demand curve. 
We can think of this schedule as saying that the wage that the firm can afford to pay each 
worker, and yet maintain a normal level of profits, declines as the measure of labour-
market tightness increases. As the labour market becomes tighter, so there are fewer 
unemployed workers for each job vacancy, it becomes increasingly harder for a firm to 
fill up that vacancy. Hence the expected time duration of a job vacancy or of maintaining 
an unfilled position is longer. It is, however, expensive to keep a position unfilled for too 
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long in the hope of finding a suitable job candidate. Apart from the direct expenses 
incurred to advertise that position, the capital already committed to open that job position 
is left unutilized meanwhile and that is an opportunity cost to the firm. The interest value 
associated with this total cost must be subtracted from the marginal value product of the 
worker to figure out how much the firm can afford to pay each worker and yet maintain 
normal profits. In addition, a job separation that destroys the worker-firm match acts like 
an interest cost since it shortens the life of a successful job match requiring the reopening 
of a new job vacancy. As the level of labour-market tightness increases, the duration of a 
job vacancy increases and the associated interest cost of maintaining the job vacancy 
increases so the affordable wage decreases imparting a negative slope to the labour-
demand curve. An increase in labour productivity, whether achieved through capital 
deepening or technological improvement, shifts the labour-demand curve to the right. On 
the other hand, an increase in the interest rate as well as an increase in the job-separation 
rate act to shift the labour-demand curve to the left. 
 
What is the reason the unemployment rate was so high in 1966? The hypothesis 
put forth here is that the shortage of capital and lack of access to technology kept the 
marginal value product of labour low at given interest rates so the labour demand curve 
in Diagram 2 is far to the left. Juxtaposed against the wage-setting curve, the level of 
labour market tightness is accordingly low with few vacancies per unemployed worker. 
The ray from the origin in Diagram 1 then has a very gentle slope so its intersection with 
the Beveridge curve corresponds to a low rate of vacancy and a high rate of 
unemployment.  
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What then caused the unemployment rate to glide downwards in the following 
two decades? Answering this question requires us to get back to some fundamental 
questions in development economics: Why are some nations poor while others are rich? 
If the lack of capital is the cause of poverty, why doesn’t capital flow from the capital-
abundant country to the capital-scarce country where the law of diminishing return to 
capital would suggest that the rate of return in the latter should be correspondingly high? 
The answer must be that in the mind of investors, the mere fact that capital is scarce does 
not imply that a unit of investment will invariably fetch a higher return. Something about 
the quality of the nation’s workers especially their work attitude, which affects the 
amount of work absenteeism and shirking, as well as the overall quality of the business 
environment or the quality of the social infrastructure matter for investors’ evaluation of 
the return from setting up a business overseas. What seems to have happened is that the 
Singapore government succeeded in convincing foreign investors in the first few years 
after independence that it had the right workforce and institutional environment to make 
investing here a worthwhile activity for them. As a result, it set in motion a huge inflow 
of foreign capital that brought along with it new technology and markets.  
 
The manufacturing sector might have been a leading sector whose expansion was 
propelled by inflows of foreign direct investment but it also had important linkages with 
the rest of the economy. Some locally-owned business activities were developed to 
support a thriving manufacturing sector; as workers found employment in the 
manufacturing sector, their spending power also increased to support the services sector. 
As incomes rose and public finances increased, the public sector also expanded to meet 
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the demands of both businesses as well as the population. As a result, employment 
expansion occurred across the different sectors in the economy. In terms of Diagram 2 
then, there was a steady rightward shift of the labour demand curve over the following 
two decades leading to rising real wages and increasing labour-market tightness. In 
Diagram 1, the ray from the origin moved in a counter-clockwise direction leading to a 
decline in the unemployment rate and a rise in the vacancy rate. To meet new job 
vacancies that were opening up, the government increasingly had to rely on a pool of 
foreign workers. 
 
With the strong influx of foreign direct investments flowing into the economy 
bringing in its wake large numbers of job openings, the image of the first two decades 
after independence is that of the arrival of a big wave. The wave was so strong that 
despite several adverse shocks that hit the economy during this period---the withdrawal 
of the British troops in 1968, the two major oil crises in 1973-74 and 1979, and the US 
recession in 1981-82---there was a relentless decline in the rate of unemployment. But 
could this be counted on to continue unabated? Does success itself set in motion changes 
that would attenuate future employment expansion? 
 
The Golden Decade and the Turbulent Years 
At the end of the two decades of relentless employment expansion, a huge spike in the 
unemployment rate suddenly occurred in 1986. How do we explain that? One possible 
explanation might be that diminishing returns to capital had finally set in so the labour-
demand curve could no longer continue its relentless shift to the right, at any rate, not at 
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the pace it did in the past. It is also possible that the high interest rate environment in the 
first half of the 1980s acted to push the labour-demand curve to the left (see Figure 4). On 
top of these influences on labour demand, two decades of rapid growth had also raised 
the wealth levels of the workforce, which would have made workers more eager to 
bargain for higher wages at any given level of labour-market tightness. In terms of 
Diagram 2, there was an upward shift of the wage-setting curve that occurred in tandem 
with the leftward shift of the labour-demand curve with the result that the level of labour-
market tightness fell. In terms of Diagram 1, the ray from the origin moved in a 
clockwise direction giving rise to a higher rate of unemployment and a lower vacancy 
rate in 1986. 
 
Figure 4 
Real Interest Rate 
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If my thesis is right that after the relentless shift of the labour-demand curve in the 
catch-up phase from 1966-85, the predominant shift was that of the wage-setting curve 
that moved upwards as workers’ wealth rose so they increasingly hardened their 
bargaining position, why is it that we then observed a decade from 1989 to 1998 of such 
low unemployment rate, roughly at 2 percent? Wouldn’t we expect to observe a steady 
decline in the measure of labour-market tightness along with steadily rising 
unemployment? We find from looking at Figure 5 that, in fact, since 1989 the level of 
labour-market tightness was indeed declining so there were increasingly fewer job 
vacancies per unemployed worker while  Figure 2 shows that real wages were also rising 
during the golden decade. This pattern is consistent with an upward shift of the wage-
setting curve that exceeded any upward shift of the labour-demand curve that occurred. 
The reason that the unemployment rate could remain so low (at about 2 percent) when the 
level of labour-market tightness was declining must be that the Beveridge curve in 
Diagram 1 was shifting inwards towards the origin even as the ray from the origin was 
moving in a clockwise direction. The result is that the vacancy rate was declining (see 
Figure 6) at a roughly unchanged rate of unemployment.  
 
What is it that caused the Beveridge curve to shift inwards? The golden decade 
coincided with two important events: the first was a booming regional economy that led 
to a thriving financial sector as funds flowed into the region and the second was that the 
world set off on the telecommunications and internet boom. Singapore had the ready 
supply of IT-trained personnel as well as financial sector workers needed to fill many 
new vacancies that were created as a result of these two events. Consequently, job 
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matching was relatively easy, implying an inward shift of the Beveridge curve. The array 
of points in Figure 7 that correspond to the years of the golden decade seems to suggest 
that just such a shift of the Beveridge curve occurred. 
 
Figure 5 
Theta (Vacancy over Unemployment) 
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Figure 6 
Vacancy Rate 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Source: Ministry of Manpower 
 20
Figure 7 
Beveridge Curve 
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The favourable events that we have associated with the golden decade, however, 
turned nasty with the onslaught of the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997 and the 
end of the internet boom in 2001. Figure 8 shows that the retrenchment rate, which we 
shall use as a proxy for the job separation rate, jumped up in 1998 and 2001. In terms of 
Diagram 2, the upward jump in the job separation rate translates into a leftward shift of 
the labour-demand curve. Juxtaposed against the wage-setting curve, this implies a drop 
in the level of labour-market tightness. In terms of Diagram 1, there is a clockwise 
movement of the ray from the origin so that, juxtaposed against a downward-sloping 
Beveridge curve, there is a drop in the vacancy rate and a rise in the unemployment rate. 
Without a big wave like that which we saw in the catch-up phase, adverse shocks---not 
just the contagion effect from the Asian financial crisis and the end of the internet boom 
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but also the effects of SARS---now translated into big declines in growth of real wage 
earnings and levels of labour-market tightness. (In contrast, during the catch-up phase, 
adverse shocks such as the oil shocks of 1973-4 and 1979 and the US recession of 1981 
made little noticeable impact on the registered rate of unemployment.) 
 
Figure 8 
Number of Retrenched Workers and Retrenchment Rate 
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Back to the Future 
How do job prospects look like as we look to the future? Is the climb in the 
unemployment rate we see in Figure 1 after 1998 set to continue to rise to reach a higher 
plateau perhaps? One way to think about whether the unemployment rate will remain at 
its current level (at 3.4 percent at the time of writing, November 2004) or can be expected 
to rise further is to ask yet another question: Based upon historical experience, what is the 
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rate of growth of real GDP that will be required to keep the unemployment rate steady? 
Table 2 presents the results of regressing the change in the unemployment rate on the rate 
of real GDP growth for the period 1967-2002. Figure 9 presents a graphical 
representation of what is sometimes called “Okun’s Law,” a statistical relationship 
between the change in the rate of unemployment and the rate of GDP growth. We find 
that based upon our historical experience, it would be necessary to achieve an annual 
growth rate of real GDP of 7.1 percent in order to keep the unemployment rate 
unchanged. The Okun’s Law relationship also tells us that, historically, a one-percentage 
point shortfall of the real GDP growth rate below 7.1 percent in any given year results in 
a rise in the unemployment rate of 0.12 percentage points over the previous year. 
Achieving an average annual growth rate of 9.1 percent in a given year, say, leads to a 
decline in the unemployment rate of 0.24 percentage points over the previous year 
producing a transition of approximately 5,000 workers from an unemployed to an 
employed status. As a statistical matter, it comes as no surprise that our unemployment 
rate made such an impressive decline over the span of the past three decades since we 
have managed to achieve growth rates in excess of 7.1 percent over so many years.   
 
Table 2 
Regression Results for Okun’s Law 
 
Dependent Variable: Change in Unemployment Rate (percentage points) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Real GDP Growth -0.1211 0.0221 
    Constant 0.8577 0.2013 
   
R-squared: 0.47  
F-statistic (p-value): 29.91  (0.00)  
Durbin-Watson: 2.16  
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Figure 9 
Scatter Plot of Change in Unemployment Rate vs Real GDP Growth Rate 
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To be able to make use of the Okun’s Law relationship to predict where 
Singapore’s unemployment rate is likely to head, we need to have a theory that gives a 
causal link between the unemployment rate and the economic growth rate. What is a 
plausible theory underlying such a statistical relationship? What is the significance of the 
growth rate at which the unemployment rate neither rises nor falls? Conceptually, it is 
useful to imagine a balanced growth path along which an economy might find itself 
characterized by a constant level of labour-market tightness, a constant unemployment 
rate and a corresponding constant job vacancy rate, as well as a constant rate of real wage 
growth. To be in such a balanced-growth state would require that workers bargain for 
wage increases at the rate that the economy will actually grow at. If workers’ forecast of 
growth falls behind the actual growth performance, the wages they bargain for would turn 
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out to fall below the wages that firms can actually afford to pay them with the result that 
firms will find it profitable to expand employment. Consequently, the unemployment rate 
declines when workers under-forecast growth. On the other hand, if the economy turns 
out to be more anaemic than workers actually forecast, the wages that workers bargain 
for will turn out to be unaffordable for firms with the result that more workers will have 
to be laid off. Consequently, the unemployment rate rises when workers over-forecast 
growth. Only when workers’ growth forecast is largely borne out by experience will the 
unemployment rate remain steady. Based upon our historical experience since 
independence, the balanced-growth state appears to coincide with an average annual 
growth rate of 7.1 percent. Consequently, if the economy is able to generate at most 5 
percent real GDP annual growth rate (the high end of the range of official medium-term 
projections of our economy’s growth rate, which is 3 to 5 percent), it would seem that the 
unemployment rate would simply have to continue to rise from its current level based 
upon the historical relationship.  
 
Is there any reason, however, to believe that the Okun’s Law relationship for a 
fast-developing country like ours might be expected to change once we have reached the 
status of a mature economy as we now have become? In other words, is it possible that 
the negatively-sloped line describing the Okun’s Law relationship in Figure 9 might shift 
towards the origin as the economy matures, which implies a decline in the real GDP 
growth rate required to keep the unemployment rate steady?  After all, in a mature 
economy like the US, the critical real GDP growth rate required to keep the 
unemployment rate steady is a few percentage points below the 7.1 percent we calculated 
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for Singapore based upon our historical relationship. It would seem very likely that the 
Okun’s Law relationship would indeed shift as the economy matures. As workers adjust 
their expectations to the reality that the economy has reached a new growth regime 
corresponding to slower growth and they incorporate their revised growth expectations in 
wage bargaining, they would reach a new (lower) balanced-growth state. The 
unemployment rate can, therefore, be expected to continue to rise only insofar as workers 
continue to overestimate the economy’s growth potential. Thinking in this way suggests 
that an important job for policy makers is to manage workers’ expectations, something 
that may not be easy to do since older workers remember the phenomenal improvement 
in their job situation over their life cycle and expect this to continue while new workers 
remember the great improvement their own parents experienced and believe that to be the 
normal course of events for them too. Paradoxically, the negative shocks that the 
economy experienced during the recent turbulent years of 1998-2003 may have helped 
workers to revise their expectations downwards, which would obviate the need for the 
economy to continue to suffer rising unemployment to force workers to match their 
expectations to reality.    
  
We have argued that there is no reason for the unemployment rate to continue 
rising once workers come to a more realistic estimate of the economy’s new (lower) 
growth potential but have not provided any answer to the question: What will determine 
the equilibrium volume of joblessness once the economy has settled down to the new 
balanced growth path and workers’ expectations are realistically set? It seems to me that 
a couple of reasons suggest that the equilibrium rate of unemployment in the lower 
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growth regime will be higher than the corresponding rate in the high balanced-growth 
regime. First, for a given world interest rate, which our small open economy takes 
parametrically, a decline in the economy’s potential growth rate is likely to reduce the 
pace at which firms are likely to create new job openings. This is because firms evaluate 
the future contributions of workers to their profit stream when they commit current 
resources to create job vacancies. When the potential growth rate is high, firms are very 
willing to bring forward new job openings since they expect huge contributions to the 
profit stream from their current new hires. Conversely, when there is a decline in the 
potential growth rate at any given real interest rate, firms are more reluctant to commit 
current resources to open new job vacancies. In terms of Diagram 2, there is a leftward 
shift of the labour demand curve. Second, just as the Beveridge curve in Diagram 1 
shifted towards the origin during the golden decade when the booming regional economy 
and internet boom found a ready supply of white-collar workers to fill new job openings 
in the financial and information sector, it is likely that the Beveridge curve can now be 
expected to shift out as low-skilled blue-collar workers find that they are unsuitable to fill 
the new job vacancies which require a set of skills they don’t possess. 
 
In response to the worsened medium to long term outlook for the labour market, 
one is tempted to ask: Can anything be done by policy-makers to reduce the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment in this new balanced-growth state? Some might argue that 
aggregate demand policy---an expansionary monetary policy, an expansionary fiscal 
policy, and an exchange rate policy aimed at improving international competitiveness---
can be used to lower the unemployment rate. In reply, it can first be pointed out that 
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maintaining our status as an international financial centre with little restrictions on cross-
border capital mobility and a commitment to maintain exchange rate stability (and hence 
price-level stability) implies that the country cannot also exercise independent monetary 
policy---the classical policy trilemma problem facing open economies. Having given up 
an independent monetary policy, can’t the Monetary Authority of Singapore now aim at 
weakening the Singapore dollar to boost international competitiveness, and so create jobs 
by increasing aggregate demand through discouraging imports and encouraging exports. 
This policy, however, has the risk of inducing competitive devaluations by other 
countries making it, in effect, a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Moreover, if the exchange 
rate is frequently used as an anti-recessionary tool, it leads to greater exchange rate 
variability, which may discourage foreign direct investments, and produce greater 
variability in domestic inflation.  
 
Others might argue: Since the country has already accumulated such a large stock 
of foreign reserves, isn’t it time to adopt a consistently expansionary fiscal policy now 
through both a substantial cut in tax rates and a steady increase in government spending? 
What reason is there for the country to continue to run structural fiscal budgetary 
surpluses in the future? Although common sense suggests that it cannot be right that we 
aim to increase government assets through running surpluses without bound, three 
considerations suggest that our optimal fiscal position is in the direction of more 
structural surpluses. The first consideration is that our commitment to remain integrated 
into the world economy through free international capital flows means that we are 
vulnerable to currency crises. In order to develop an immunity against currency crises, 
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Martin Feldstein (1999) has suggested that a country needs to increase its international 
liquidity position in the sense of increasing its foreign exchange reserves as a ratio to its 
short-term foreign liabilities. This stock of foreign reserves can be built up gradually 
through generating fiscal surpluses. The second consideration is that our changing 
demographics will, by itself, imply increased demand on government resources in the 
future for health needs. Moreover, Franco Modigliani's life-cycle theory of saving (see 
Modigliani, 1975) suggests that in the 1960s, when the young-age dependency ratio was 
high, saving was low. Then, when more of the population was in the working age 
category, saving increased. However, with longevity, a time will come when the old-age 
dependency ratio will rise and then saving will be reduced again. We should therefore 
save more now. The third consideration applies the logic of precautionary saving at the 
level of the individual to the state. If we are committed to remain open, to be integrated 
into the world economy, in order to continue to grow, we face the inevitability of being 
vulnerable to external shocks. Just as individuals save above the normal level for the 
proverbial rainy day, a country has to have additional resources to distribute to those who 
are hurt by the country's openness in order to maintain the social cohesion necessary to 
stay open. Hence, while an expansionary fiscal policy is a useful complementary measure 
to use in severe recessions, longer-term considerations may argue against using it mainly 
as a tool to create jobs by expanding aggregate demand.  
 
If I am right that there are severe limits to the use of expansionary aggregate 
demand policy as a means of lowering the average rate of unemployment, can wage 
reform do the job? I believe that the major case for wage reform is not that it will lower 
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our average rate of unemployment in the future. Instead, it is to provide a substitute for 
the use of major cuts in employers’ Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution rates as a 
means of saving jobs when huge adverse shocks hit the economy. Without the option of 
making huge downward adjustments in firms’ calculation of the marginal cost of hiring a 
worker, big adverse shocks that hit the bottom line of a substantial number of firms will 
result in a big layoff of workers. In the past, when the economy faced sharp recessionary 
shocks, major cuts in the employers’ CPF contribution rates were promptly implemented. 
A cut in employers’ CPF contributions, though it has the advantage of being applied 
across the board, if used too frequently compromises the purpose of the CPF as a social 
security system. This then leaves greater wage flexibility, in particular, downward 
flexibility as a necessary tool to minimize job losses when the country is faced with an 
adverse external shock. Since there are forces tending to raise Singapore's structural rate 
of unemployment, having a more flexible wage structure allows the country to at least 
avoid large increases in cyclical unemployment. 
  
It might not be an easy matter, however, to push all companies to shift from fixed 
to flexible pay for reasons that have to do with risks, incentives, and measurement 
costs. (a) Risks: If workers are highly risk averse, they would strongly prefer a fixed 
wage to a variable wage that pays them the same expected amount on average. Then if 
one firm moves to the variable pay method while the other firms have not or do not, it 
stands to lose its workers to those competitors who are slower to implement the flexi-
wage scheme. Workers basically have to be convinced that to have increased 
employment stability they would have to accept reduced wage stability. Possibly, the 
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recent spate of job losses due to a series of adverse shocks---SARS, end of internet boom, 
financial sector restructuring, etc.---has helped workers to come to accept this reality of a 
trade-off between job security and wage certainty better. (b) Incentives: Varying wages 
affect the incentive of workers to exert their work effort, and go the extra mile in their 
work. Announcing to workers that their pay would be cut can lead to a loss of 
morale, which ultimately hurts the bottom line of firms, if they do not feel that the pay 
cut is justified. A lot of energy would, therefore, have to be exerted at the firm level to 
create a transparent accounting system so that any firm's workforce is convinced that any 
pay cut is justified, especially if other firms in the economy seem to be doing well. (3) 
Measurement costs: To move from a fixed to a variable wage system, it becomes very 
important to be able to measure how well each worker's effort is tied to the company's 
performance. This may be easy to do in some businesses, like the manufacture of 
umbrellas, for example, but much more difficult and hence more costly to do, in other 
businesses, say, in a consultancy business. Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis conducted 
by each firm or industry regarding how far it will go towards a move to a flexible-wage 
system would very likely come out with somewhat different answers for different firms 
or industries. Some firms or industries would find it optimal to go further in the direction 
of wage flexibility more than others. 
 
If expansionary aggregate demand policy and wage reform are not the panacea for 
structural unemployment, can anything else be done? There are two possible responses 
here. The first is to say that there are, indeed, some things that can be done that affect the 
structural rate of unemployment directly, namely policies that directly affect job creation 
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and firm-worker matches. On job creation, one proposal that merits serious consideration 
is the introduction of an employment subsidy scheme that subsidizes firms that hire low-
skilled workers. In terms of Diagram 2, a subsidy creates a wedge between the wage-
setting curve and the labour demand curve so that a worker’s take-home pay is higher 
than what the firm actually pays, the difference being made up by the subsidy paid for by 
the government. Is there any economic justification for society to foot the bill for 
implementing an employment subsidy scheme? If we accept the argument that a society 
suffering from a high incidence of long-term joblessness creates serious negative 
externalities for the rest of society through such things as a loss of respect for common 
property and increased crime and theft, there would seem to be a case for the state to pay 
from out of its total tax revenue an employment subsidy to bring the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment down to a level below that prevailing without any government 
intervention. The reader’s attention is drawn here to Phelps (1997), which presents a 
cogent argument for the introduction of an employment subsidy scheme and calculates 
the cost of implementing such a scheme in the US. Creating a more conducive business 
environment, in particular one which places few barriers towards the creation of new 
firms, also acts to shift the labour demand curve to the right and so increases labour 
market tightness and reduces the rate of unemployment. On improving firm-worker 
matches, the newly created Workforce Development Agency provides relevant training 
for unemployed workers and attempts to match them with firms requiring workers with 
the new skills. The fact that we are geographically a small country will give us an 
advantage in matching workers to jobs.  
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The second response is to accept that despite the effort to train unemployed 
workers, some will continue to remain unemployable. The relevant question then is 
whether society will be willing to pay for some minimal level of unemployment benefits 
or provide some alternative means of social insurance to soften the financial impact of 
being out of work. We have been able in the past thirty-five years or so to keep 
government spending as a ratio of GDP at about 20 percent, which is about half the level 
of other OECD countries despite our high degree of openness. (Our trade to GDP ratio is 
about 300 percent.) I believe that we were able to do so from about 1965 onwards 
because our priority in spending on the economic infrastructure—not simply good roads 
and industrial estates but also investing in good people in the civil service who created a 
business-friendly environment for foreign investors—led to a wave of foreign direct 
investments and catapulted us into catch-up growth that translated into good jobs and 
reasonably good pay. So there was no demand for things such as unemployment benefits. 
Catch-up growth has more or less petered out by now. (We were at about 20 percent of 
US income level on a purchasing power adjusted basis in the early 1960s and now at 
about 90 percent.) The rush of factories in Singapore in search of relatively unskilled but 
hardworking workers is also over. In order to grow requires a move away from 
accumulation to innovation. Yet this innovative phase still requires a deep integration 
into the world economy. I noted earlier that our measure of labour-market tightness was 
declining as the wage-setting curve was shifting up through the wealth effect without 
being offset by strong rightward shifts of the labour-demand curve. The reason we were 
able to achieve roughly 2 percent unemployment rate despite the steady decline in labour-
market tightness is that our economy had the right institutions and people to ride on the 
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periodic wave that came our way when the regional economy boomed and an internet 
revolution occurred. These opportunities came because we remained open to the 
international economy. However, staying integrated to the world economy means that we 
are going to be subject to negative external shocks periodically but now without the 
benefit of the earlier wave of job-creating foreign direct investments helping us to absorb 
the shock. In this climate, political reality requires that there be increased social spending 
to help the disadvantaged just simply so that social cohesion be maintained. The key 
thing is that any society has to choose a point on the trade-off schedule between equity 
and efficiency. With changes in technology and our comparative advantage shifted 
against the less skilled, we will need to actively redistribute more towards those at the 
lower end of the income scale just to maintain the same combination of efficiency and 
equity point we had before. Consequently, I believe that just to keep a policy of being 
integrated into the world economy viable, we will need to increase our share of the 
national pie on providing social safety nets. The challenge is to provide an adequate 
cushion from shocks without stifling incentive too much. Research suggests that, in 
designing our own mix of social safety nets, we should try to aim at providing the 
economy with enough flexibility to respond to changes in the world economy. There is 
no one-size-fits-all model for devising social insurance. We will have to draw from our 
historical experience and cultural context to develop our own unique set of social safety 
nets. 
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Conclusion 
When the country gained independence in 1965, creating employment for the large pool 
of jobless individuals was a major challenge facing the government. The route that we 
took to bring the unemployment rate down was not that of Keynesian aggregate demand 
policy via monetary expansion or fiscal pump-priming. Instead, we focused our attention 
on building an institutional environment that was conducive to the setting up of 
businesses, especially foreign enterprises with financial resources and access to the world 
market, and promoting a hardworking and reliable workforce even if not one that was 
particularly skilled. As the first foreign enterprises setting up shop in Singapore spread 
the word around that Singapore was a reliable place to set up factories to produce items 
for sale into the world market, a fresh flow of new foreign direct investments came in, 
which created a wave of new jobs. That flood of new jobs was so big that despite several 
adverse shocks to the economy---the withdrawal of British troops in 1968, the two world 
oil crises in 1973-74 and 1979 and the global recession in 1981---there was hardly a dent 
on the registered rate of unemployment. Instead, there was a relentless decline in the 
unemployment rate from close to 9 percent in 1966 to about 3 percent in the early 1980s 
without fueling inflationary pressures, a sign that it was the structural rate of 
unemployment that was steadily decline during this catch-up phase. It was not the 
increased supply of jobs brought in by the flood of foreign direct investments and 
associated growth of small and medium-sized enterprises that acted singly to bring down 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The fact that workers’ expectations of future 
growth prospects were not particularly bright for a newly-independent country (after all, 
whether such a small nation without an important hinterland could survive was a serious 
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question) also meant that they were not particularly choosy about jobs, being glad simply 
that they were able to find employment with a reasonable living wage. The result was that 
firms found it profitable to hire a large number of them, which steadily brought down the 
unemployment rate. 
 
The year 1986 might have marked an important turning point for the economy. By 
then, workers had lived through two whole decades of phenomenal growth and associated 
increases in wealth levels and so came to feel emboldened to bargain for higher wages at 
any given level of labour-market tightness. Ironically, by this time, diminishing returns to 
capital accumulation might also have set in implying that the wages workers felt 
emboldened to bargain for were getting ahead of the wage levels firms could afford to 
pay. The result is that from about 1989 the number of job vacancies per unemployed 
worker (an indicator of the tightness of the labour market) began a steady decline. Yet, 
the unemployment rate remained stable at its lowest level of about 2 percent for the 
period 1989-1998, the golden decade. What prevented the economy’s unemployment rate 
from starting to creep up despite the bargained wage getting ahead of the affordable wage 
during this period is that the economy had a ready supply of trained information 
technology workers and business graduates to fill up positions created by a booming 
regional economy and onslaught of the internet revolution. Our commitment to stay 
integrated into the global economy and the investment in skills training and education 
made the economy ready for the periodic wave of opportunity thrown up by the new 
technology and evolving world economy. 
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I believe that, ultimately, it is this commitment to develop institutions that make 
our economy able to seize on new opportunities brought about by new technology and an 
evolving world economy that will allow the country to obtain unusually low rates of 
unemployment such as occurred during the golden decade of 1989-1998. However, 
remaining globally connected in order to ride on waves of opportunities also means 
exposing ourselves to the vagaries of the ups and downs of the world economy. Without 
the strong inflows of foreign direct investments in search of low-skilled but reliable 
workers that we had in the first two decades after independence to counteract the job 
destructive effects of adverse external shocks now, there is a great need for the country to 
seriously consider a more adequate provision of a social safety net to soften the financial 
impact of joblessness that is most likely to be concentrated among the less skilled 
workers. Reaching out for a weaker Singapore dollar in order to boost international 
competitiveness, and so to boost aggregate demand and hence employment, or reaching 
out for budgetary deficits as a direct means to boost aggregate demand is unlikely to have 
a lasting effect on the structural rate of unemployment. It would be better to consider 
policies aimed directly at influencing equilibrium unemployment. One proposal to 
seriously study is the feasibility of introducing an employment subsidy scheme aimed 
particularly at low-skilled workers, which has the effect of increasing job creation 
directly. Further effort to create a business-friendly environment that will encourage new 
start-ups to test new ideas in the marketplace by ensuring minimal red tape and enabling 
relatively easy financing for them will also work to increase the pace of job creation. 
Finally, the good work of the Workforce Development Agency and Community 
Development Councils aimed at retraining low-skilled and older workers to meet the 
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skills demand of new jobs and then matching them to firms offering the job vacancies 
should help somewhat in bringing down, or at any rate temper the rise of, the structural 
rate of unemployment as our small geographical area works to our advantage when it 
comes to job-matching.        
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